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Article 2

A Law Enforcement Primer on Vehicle Searches
Kevin Corr*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") receives over 50,000
fingerprint cards every weekday.' Some of the people whose
fingerprints were obtained were undoubtedly arrested as a result of a
traffic stop. Such arrests were likely concomitant with a vehicle
search. Significantly, items of evidence may be located during a
vehicle search. Thus, it is critically important that law enforcement
officers follow proper legal procedure when conducting such searches.
Vehicle searches often result in the finding of contraband or
evidence of some crime. If such search results are suppressed, the
likelihood of a successful prosecution is severely diminished. Defense
attorneys who review police incident reports that appear to be
incomplete or which fail to articulate a specific basis for a vehicle
search may be more apt to file a motion to suppress. Conversely, a
well prepared police report may demonstrate to both the prosecution
and defense that the officer is a professional who will be a wellprepared witness.
Conducting a vehicle search pursuant to a search warrant is always
the preferred search method. Because a vehicle search pursuant to a
warrant shows that the officer conducting the search took the extra step
of having the factual situation independently evaluated, such searches
are more likely to withstand scrutiny. However, time constraints and
other exigencies routinely "interfere" with this preference. 2 As a
* Kevin Corr is a Supervisory Special Agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and is the Chief Division Counsel in the FBI's Springfield, Illinois Division. He
received his bachelor's degree with honors and distinction in criminal justice from the
University of Illinois in 1977 and his Juris Doctor degree from Loyola University of
Chicago in 1980. He has served the FBI in the Sacramento, California and New York
City Divisions and in the Legal Counsel Division at FBI Headquarters in Washington,
D.C. Prior to joining the FBI, he was an Assistant State's Attorney in Oregon, Illinois.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the U.S. Department of Justice or the FBI.
1. The FBI is the central repository for felony arrestees' fingerprint cards as well as
military personnel fingerprint cards. As such, the FBI receives thousands of fingerprint
cards every weekday from numerous agencies.
2. When a vehicle is stopped in traffic, even if probable cause exists for a search
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result, officers often conduct vehicle searches without a warrant.3
Because of the many nuances raised by such searches, the officers
may routinely conduct a search without a sufficient grasp of the
various warrantless search theories that may be applicable in a given
situation. This article discusses five ways to search vehicles without a
warrant: consent;4 vehicular frisk;5 search incident to arrest; 6 vehicle
exception;7 and inventory.8
Law enforcement officers must have a strong grasp of these
exceptions to make the exceptions effective. First, these exceptions
are widely used but are closely scrutinized. Officers who can properly
"pigeonhole" a vehicle search under an exception, therefore, stand a
better chance of being able to justify the search. They may also be in a
better position to discern and deflect trick questions posed by defense
attorneys. Second, the specific areas of a vehicle that may be searched
vary widely depending on which exception is used. Third, some
theories overlap. An officer may use them in combination or must
choose the best one to use. Finally, another more expansive search
theory may suddenly emanate during a search, thus allowing a broader
search than that originally contemplated.
Tables at the end of this article illustrate the basic prerequisites and
parameters of the five major warrantless search theories. Table 1
shows the permissible search areas according to the particular search
theory being used. For example, consent that is restricted in scope
limits permissible search areas. Table 2 illustrates the object of each of
warrant (see infra Part V), a warrantless search conducted on site quickly confirms or
dispels the suspicions of the police and results in the driver being inconvenienced for a
much shorter period than it would take for a search warrant to be procured. Moreover,
some dangerous suspects are stopped at gunpoint. Having an officer leave the site to
obtain a search warrant is impractical. In many instances, the officer stopping the
vehicle is the sole officer on the scene. Also, the mobility of vehicles is a factor. A
vehicle could move outside the jurisdiction of a warrant by the time a warrant was
obtained, unless one officer detained the vehicle while another sought the warrant.
3. However, when officers come upon an unoccupied vehicle that they had not seen in
motion, and they desire to search the vehicle, these two factors coupled together should
serve as a "warning flag" that a search warrant might be the best procedure to follow.
Since some prosecutors and judges focus on the inherent mobility of stopped vehicles as
the justification for a warrantless vehicle search, an unoccupied vehicle found parked
may be deemed to. lack such mobility. Even if a warrant is not needed in some of these
instances, it may be more prudent to obtain one, based upon the known preferences of
the local magistrate who may be called upon to rule on the validity of the search.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part VI.
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the five types of vehicle search theories. Table 3 notes the general
prerequisites for a vehicle search for each of the major search theories.
A summary flowchart, which guides officers through the basics of the
five search theories, is also included. Although charts and flowcharts
never can substitute for legal training, they serve as summaries or
memory triggers after such training is received.
By striving to discern the major differences between the varied
search theories, officers will seem more credible and might see more
of their searches upheld. This article is meant as a primer only. An indepth analysis of vehicle search law is beyond the scope of this article.
II. CONSENT
Consent is often the first search method attempted because it is one
of the easiest ways to search a vehicle. Although not problem free, the
consent search may be all that is available when no other warrant
exception exists. Moreover, an officer may ask for consent even when
the officer does not suspect anything amiss.
To be valid, consent must be voluntary.9 Courts generally use a
totality of the circumstances test when determining if consent is
voluntary.' ° Factors used in the evaluation include: whether the
person was advised of his right to refuse consent;" the person's age
and education;' 2 the person's experience in dealing with the police; 3
and whether there was a display of weapons or other show of force by
the police.' 4 An officer's failure to inform a lawfully stopped motorist
that he is free to go prior to asking for consent to search 5 does not
9. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); United States v. Kon
Yu-Leung, 910 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 1990).
10. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. In Schneckloth, a driver was pulled over by
the police for a burned out headlight and license plate light. See id. at 220. When the
driver could not produce a license, the officer asked to search the car. See id. The driver
consented and even assisted the officer during the search. See id. The court held that the
driver's response to the officer's question was voluntarily given because there was no
indication of coercion by the police. See id. at 247. The court explained further that
although the officer's failure to apprise the driver of his right to refuse was a factor to
consider in determining the voluntary nature of his consent, it was not a "prerequisite to
establishing voluntary consent." Id. at 249.
11. See id. at 227.
12. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (finding a 22-year
old with an 11 th grade education capable of a knowing consent).
13. See United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 556 (1st Cir. 1993) (considering
defendant's eight prior convictions as evidence that his actions reflected consent).
14. See United States v. Guiterrez, 92 F.3d 468, 471 (7th Cir. 1996).
15. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996); People v. Brownlee, 687
N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
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alone make the consent involuntary. 6
Obtaining the vehicle's driver's consent to search the car is the
standard practice. Like the captain of a ship, the driver is generally the
one exerting control over the vehicle.17 Officers must be careful,
however, when a driver consents to a search while a passenger's
belongings are left on the passenger's seat.' 8 Separate consent, a
distinct exception to the general rule requiring search warrants, is
needed to search the passenger's belongings.19 Additionally, a
passenger's consent to search his or her belongings might not be
implied even if the passenger kept quiet when informed of the driver's
consent to search and the driver's identification of the passenger as the
owner.2" If a passenger is really the vehicle's owner, and the driver
consents to a search of the vehicle, the passenger's silence when he is
told of such consent does not necessarily mean that the passenger
provided implied consent.
An officer may receive consent in one of three ways: written, oral,
or implied.2 Typically, the driver is stopped for a routine traffic
16. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40 (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not
require that a lawfully seized driver be advised that he is "free to go" before the driver's
consent to the search will be recognized as voluntary); Brownlee, 687 N.E.2d at 1176
(holding that neither the federal constitution nor the Illinois constitution require the
"first-tell-then-ask" rule whereby a police officer informs a stopped motorist that he is
free to go before asking the motorist for consent to search his vehicle), appeal granted,
177 Ill. 2d 573 (Ill. 1998).
17. See United States v. Morales, 861 F.2d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1998).
18. For example, it has been held that the driver's consent to search does not
encompass a passenger's purse. See United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1993);
People v. James, 163 Ill.2d 302 (1994).
19. See Welch, 4 F.3d at 764 (providing three ways that the government can
establish third party consent: (1) by providing evidence of shared use and joint access,
(2) by showing that the owner expressly authorized a third party to give consent, or (3)
by establishing the 'apparent authority' doctrine).
20. See United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 1996). In Jaras, the car
driver gave the police officer permission to search his car and alerted the officer that the
suitcases in the car's trunk did not belong to him but to the car's passenger. See id. The
officer asked the passenger what was inside the suitcases but the passenger denied
knowledge of their contents. See id. at 390. The officer then searched the suitcases
without objection from the passenger. See id. The Jaras court held that consent could
not be inferred from the passenger's silence and failure to object during the search
because the officer did not expressly or implicitly request the passenger's consent. See
id.
21. It has been the author's experience that most people who provide consent do so
orally, in response to a direct oral request to provide such. If one seems to be especially
cooperative, and/or is in custody, evidence of the person's written consent helps the
court to determine the voluntariness of one's consent. In such situations, a written
consent to search form might be given to the person to sign. Implied consent is much
less common, and may occur when an unarrested husband stands silently next to his wife
who just provided consent to search the commonly owned vehicle.
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violation, and the officer may ask routine questions regarding the
driver's destination, driver's license, registration, and proof of
insurance. A citation for some infraction may follow. Consent is
often requested orally right before a vehicle stop is finished. Obtaining
written consent to a search is less vulnerable in court than relying on
mere oral or implied consent.22 In many instances, however, a written
consent form is not used, and officers often rely solely on oral
consent.23 In such cases, consent is best secured in the presence of at
least two law enforcement officers. This will help offset a one-on-one
argument at an evidence suppression hearing regarding what was
actually said.24
Implied consent, although not favored under the law, may be
applicable in certain situations .2' A driver's failure to respond to an
officer's search request does not constitute implied consent.26 Thus, in
the majority of cases, consent will not be implied. For instance, if the
leaseholder of a rental car is riding as a passenger in the rental car, and
the driver consents to a search in the leaseholder's presence, the
leaseholder's silence may be construed as consent.27
Drivers have a right to refuse to consent to a search. Indeed, the
FBI's own internal consent-to-search form indicates that the
consenting driver was advised of his right to refuse. However, this
statement is not required under federal constitutional law. 28 A person
in custody has no federal constitutional right to consult with an
attorney before being asked to provide consent.29 No court case exists
22. Written consent can be thought of as two-fold consent. The person providing
consent would have just given oral consent and is then requested to confirm this
affirmation on a document.
23. For example, during vehicle stops, the type of consent most often relied upon is
oral consent, because the form is deemed impractical to use or is unavailable.
24. This technique allows the officers some support in court, because the oral consent
provided is corroborated by a second officer.
25. See United States v. Morales, 861 F.2d 396, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1988).
26. The driver's failure to respond could be interpreted in several ways. For example,
if the driver were under arrest, he may have exercised his right to remain silent. Perhaps
with traffic noise he did not know the question was posed to him. Perhaps he heard the
question and was thinking of his response. See generally United States v. Lindsay, 506
F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing "silent consent" scenarios).
27. See id.
28. See United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 651 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that a
demonstration of a driver's understanding of his right to refuse is not an essential factor
of voluntary consent); United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that the police were not constitutionally required to advise driver of her
right to refuse a search before obtaining consent); United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971,
977 (1st Cir. 1994) (rejecting driver's argument that the officer's failure to inform driver
of his right to refuse permission to a search negated inference of consent).
29. See United States v. Lagrone, 43 F.3d 332, 337 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United
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that requires officers to inform a person that he has a right to refuse
consent. However, since the form is most often used after the person
has already orally consented and includes a phrase on the form that the
person has the right to refuse, it provides further evidence of the
person's voluntariness in subsequent court hearings. However, the
failure to inform the person of this right is a factor in determining the
voluntariness of the person's consent. 30 Although not necessarily the
determining factor, it is one factor courts examine in the totality of
circumstances equation when evaluating the voluntariness of the
consent.31
Officers must be aware of certain problems. Under the consent
theory, officers must remember that consent may be restricted or
withdrawn at any time.32 Consent given voluntarily is presumed to
continue until it is revoked.33 However, once consent is granted,
officers must strictly adhere to the exact parameters of the consent
conferred.34 For example, if the original search has been restricted,
officers may search everywhere except the restricted area and must
honor the restriction under the consent theory. Accordingly, after
procuring consent, officers should search quickly to locate any
seizable items before the consent is further restricted or revoked. Even
if authority to search is revoked, officers must quickly evaluate
whether another warrant exception may be used in lieu of consent.
Items seized after consent has been withdrawn will be subject to
suppression 35 unless their seizure can be supported on another search
States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the request for
consent to search is not a trial-like confrontation equivalent to a pretrial lineup or
interrogation).
30. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). In Shneckloth, the
Court rejected the suggestion that for police to rely upon a waiver, they must
demonstrate that the consenter knew of his right to refuse consent. See id.; see also
United States v. Lindsay, 506 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
31. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (noting that police failure to advise accused of
his right to refuse was a factor to be evaluated in assessing voluntariness); Lattimore, 87
F.3d at 651 (pointing out that driver's understanding of a right to refuse supports a
finding of voluntariness); United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 421 (5th Cir. 1996)
(listing the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse a search as one of six factors used
in determining whether consent is given voluntarily).
32. See Vaughn v. Baldwin, 950 F.2d 331, 333 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Dyer, 784 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 744
(7th Cir. 1976); Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d 741, 746 (D.C. 1994).
33. See United States v. Alfaro, 935 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that consent
is usually revoked upon an unequivocal act or statement of withdrawal).
34.
See Griffin, 530 F.2d at 744.
35. See United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (ruling that
revocations take immediate effect, thus leaving subsequent seizures unwarranted).
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theory."
Similarly, if officers locate an item of evidence or contraband during
a consensual search, other search theories may suddenly emerge as
viable alternatives or supplements to the consent method. If drugs are
found under the front seat, an occupant can be arrested, and a search
incident to the arrest may take place.3 7 Additionally, the vehicle
exception may manifest itself. 38 In some cases, after the driver's
arrest, the vehicle will be impounded and an inventory search will be
conducted.3 9 This is especially true if the arrestee/driver was the sole
occupant of the vehicle. The scope of these searches and their legal
justifications for being conducted vary. It is important to note that an
initial search conducted solely by consent may be suddenly
transformed into a more expansive search. Further, a consent search,
originally restricted in scope, may also suddenly transform into a more
expansive search under a different search theory if something suspect
is found during the initial consent search.
Another problem is the officer's belief that a refusal of the driver to
provide consent, standing alone, is enough reason to detain the driver
while awaiting the arrival of a police canine unit. Some officers'
suspicions are especially heightened when people refuse to provide
consent to search. While this suspicion may be valid in many cases,
those suspicions alone are insufficient to allow further detention.
If a traffic citation is issued and the driver refuses to provide
consent, the driver must be allowed to depart unless another search
theory manifests. 40 If the driver consents to a search, and the officer
contacts a canine unit to assist, the waiting period becomes
36. For example, if the driver is lawfully arrested and his vehicle is to be impounded,
an inventory search will subsequently be conducted, regardless whether the driver
revokes his consent to search. In that event, the inventory justifies the search rather
than the consent.
37. See infra Part IV. A search incident to an arrest is a search conducted of a limited
area into which the arrestee might reach in order to gain access to a weapon or evidence.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). With respect to vehicles, an
arrest of any occupant permits the police to search the passenger compartment and its
unlocked containers. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
38. See discussion infra Part V. The vehicle exception is the warrantless search
theory which allows a search based upon probable cause. See discussion infra Part V.
39. See discussion infra Part VI. An inventory search of a vehicle is a warrantless
caretaking-type search which is conducted pursuant to standardized criteria. It is
generally conducted after the vehicle is impounded. See discussion infra Part VI.
40. See United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034, 1039 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that after
producing a driver's license and registration, a driver must be allowed to proceed without
further questioning); People v. Sinclair, 666 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Il1. App. Ct. 1996)
(determining that mere suspicion of criminal activity does not warrant a full search of a
person or automobile).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 30

meaningless. In other words, if the driver provides consent to search,
and his consent is valid unless and until it is revoked, then the
additional time that it takes for a canine unit to arrive is not a factor,
because the driver, perhaps foolishly, did not revoke his consent
during the additional delay. However, if during this time period, the
driver expresses a desire to leave, the officer has little choice but to let
the driver go.41 If the driver remains and does not revoke his consent,
the canine sniff is encompassed within the parameters of the original
consent.4 2 While a police drug-sniffing dog with its exceptional sense
of smell may detect narcotics far better than its human handler, the dog
is often far from the site of the traffic stop, resulting in prolonged
delays.
When a driver is formally arrested, and the officers seek consent
after the arrest occurs, no Miranda rights are needed to request the
consent.43 Similarly, if the arrested driver immediately invokes his
right to remain silent or even his right to counsel, an officer should still
ask for consent to search. 4 The arrestee's answer to the question,
"Can we search your car?" is not designed to provoke an incriminating
response, regardless of whether the answer is "yes" or "no." 45 The
arrestee is obviously in custody, but this is not the kind of custodial
interrogation for which Miranda rights are needed. 46 A person in
custody has no federal constitutional right to consult with an attorney
before providing consent.4a The United States Supreme Court has
stated that "the fact of custody alone has never been enough in itself to
demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to search. ' a Officers
may conduct a limited search based upon the search incident to arrest
exception, but this search method is typically more limited than what a
41. In such a case, the driver has exercised his right to revoke or withdraw consent.
See United States v. Dyer, 784 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1986); Burton v. United States,
657 A.2d 741, 746 (D.C. 1994).
42. See United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir. 1994).
43. See United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 83 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Lagrone, 43 F.3d 332, 337 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia,
983 F.2d 1563, 1567 (10th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Wainwright, 581 F.2d 1149, 1152 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1974); People v. Wegman, 428 N.E.2d
637, 640 (I11.App. Ct. 1981).
44. Requesting consent to search in such situations is permissible. See United States
v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1989).
45. See Glenna, 878 F.2d at 971; see also Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th
Cir. 1985) ("[S]imply put, a consent to search is not an incriminating statement.").
46. See Lemon, 550 F.2d at 472; Faruolo, 506 F.2d at 495.
47. See United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 337 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1570 (1lth Cir. 1993).
48. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976).
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consent search prior to arrest would encompass.4 9 Additionally, if the
vehicle is impounded based on the arrest, officers will usually conduct
a thorough inventory search.5 °
Officers should also be very aware of the actual words they use
when making a request for consent. For example, some officers may
make the mistake of asking for restrictive permission to "look around"
or merely to "look." If the driver consents, some courts have held that
the driver merely consented to the officer looking, but not searching. 51
Other courts have found that the word "look," especially when
examined in context, objectively communicates to a person that the
officer is making a search request.5 2 This is not merely a game of
semantics. One could argue that a look implies that the officer may
observe things as they are, but may not move anything around in order
to look. A defense attorney might argue, and a judge might agree, that
a mere look might not encompass the opening of an unlocked briefcase
or other container. In that event, a "look" would be analogous to a
plain view sighting, in which an officer may view something, but may
not be permitted to move the item for closer inspection.53 One court
has also held that the permissible scope of the defendant's consent was
limited when an officer said he did not want to look through each item
54
but merely wanted to see how things in the trunk were packed.
Additionally, the question, "Does the trunk open?" could be interpreted
literally. This ambiguous question does not directly seek consent and
leaves open the question of whether the driver consented to the trunk
being opened or felt compelled to open it. To offset such problems,
officers should specifically ask for consent to search.
Some additional factors may also affect the legality of a consentbased search. If a locked container is found during the consent search,
49. See discussion infra Part IV. A search incident to arrest of a vehicle's occupant is
limited to the person, the passenger compartment and unlocked objects within the
passenger compartment. With consent, police can search wherever they want,
consistent with the limits placed on the consent, if any, or the expressed object of the
search. See discussion infra Part IV
50. See discussion infra Part VI.
51. See People v. Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d 1186, 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), appeal
denied, 178 Ill. 2d 583 (1998).
52. See United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining
invitation to "establish a list of specific terms from which an officer must select the
most appropriate"); United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (lth Cir.
1991); United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding a request
to "look through" car is sufficient when the defendant stood beside the car while
expressing no concern).
53. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987).
54. See United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 815 (10th Cir. 1997).
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officers should proceed carefully. Notably, officers should determine
if the consent was restricted in scope and if the driver is the sole
occupant of the vehicle. Most important, the officer should evaluate
whether the container can be unlocked without forcing it open.
. When officers secure a driver's consent, they should ask for the
keys to the vehicle as well. The turned-over keys support a potential
argument by the officer that if the driver did not want the officers to
open the locked briefcase which was in the trunk, then he could have
said so."5 If the driver consents to a search of the vehicle and turns
over a set of keys, then the officers may have all the keys they need to
open all locked items found inside the vehicle. A locked container
opened by its key is arguably not forced open, and thus within the
scope of the consent provided.56 In Florida v. Jimeno,5 7 the United
States Supreme Court held that one's permission to search allows the
police to search containers that might hold the object of the search. 58
In that case, consent to search generally authorized a broad search for
drugs.59 The Court also explained, however, that it is "unreasonable
to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his trunk, has
agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the trunk. 60
Arguably, a container that is opened by unlocking it with a key is not
broken open.
In summary, officers need voluntary consent from one with
authority to provide it. Consent may be restricted or revoked at any
time, in which case officers should immediately consider whether
other search theories are applicable. Officers should ask for consent to
"search" rather than to "look," and should not break open locked
containers based upon a general consent to search.
III. VEHICULAR FRISK

A second search method that may be conducted without a search
warrant is the vehicular frisk. A warrantless search of a vehicle solely
for weapons as a pre-arrest protective measure is known as a vehicular
frisk. Before or during a vehicle stop, officers might develop
55. See United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 977 (1st Cir. 1994).
56. See United States v. Reeves, 6 F.3d 660, 662 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Zapata, 18
F.3d at 977 (explaining that a voluntary surrender of keys to both car and trunk may in
itself support an inference of consent to search the vehicle and any easily accessible
containers therein).
57. 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
58. See id. at 249.
59. See id. at 251.
60. Id. at 251-52.
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information that may lead them to believe that there is a weapon inside
the vehicle. In such an event, the officers may search the interior
passenger compartment and its unlocked containers for weapons.
A vehicular frisk search is limited both substantively and
procedurally. First, the object of the search is strictly weapons; it is
not a general search for any and all evidence of a crime.6 ' Specifically,
officers are searching for weapons which may be used against them
during the stop. 62 If any other evidence surfaces, such as narcotics,
the resulting evidence is merely a bonus for the police; such evidence
cannot be the desired object of the search.63 Second, the areas where
the search may be conducted are restricted. The vehicular frisk is
limited to the passenger compartment and its unlocked containers.6 4
The trunk, the locked glove box and any locked briefcases found on
the passenger seat are generally not permissible search areas under this
exception to the warrant requirement because the occupant may not
gain immediate control of a weapon located in these locked areas.6 5
One court upheld a protective frisk of a locked glove box.66 This
opinion, however, appears to be the exception rather than the rule.67
To conduct a search under this limited exception to the warrant
requirement, reasonable suspicion that there is a weapon inside the
vehicle is required.6 8 Notably, the standard used is not probable
cause. Although not much evidence is needed to meet the reasonable
suspicion standard, officers should note that a mere hunch or sneaking
suspicion is not enough.6 9
61. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1050.
64. See id. at 1049.
65. See id. at 1050-51 (holding that a vehicle search is restricted to those areas where
the suspect generally has immediate control).
66. See United States v. Brown, 913 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that
individuals who are allowed to return to their vehicles after a personal frisk have access
to the locked glove box, thus officers may search a locked glove box for weapons).
67. See id.
68. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that a police officer may
conduct a search for weapons where he has "reason to believe that he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime").
69. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, for the proposition
that reasonable suspicion is based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer in
believing" weapons are at hand). An officer may have reasonable suspicion if his
flashlight reveals a shiny object protruding from a bag in the vehicle of suspected
prowlers. See also United States v. Brown, 133 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 1998); People
v. Carvey, 226 A.2d 193, 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding that the officer had a
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As with a consent search, other search exceptions may come into
play during the course of a vehicular frisk. For example, if officers
find narcotics under the front seat during a vehicular frisk, several
possibilities arise. It may be possible that an occupant will be arrested
for possession of narcotics. A search incident to the arrest may then
take place, and the permissible vehicle areas that may be searched
under the vehicular frisk and search incident theories are identical.70
Finding narcotics under the front seat during a vehicular frisk may also
trigger the vehicle exception theory.7 1 In that event, a more expansive

search will be permitted whether the occupant is arrested for
possession or for any other offense. If a vehicle is impounded, a
subsequent inventory search will occur.72
Vehicular frisks may also prompt personal frisks. If a vehicular
frisk is justified on the reasonable suspicion that there is a weapon in
the vehicle, it follows that reasonable suspicion likely exists that the
driver or another occupant possesses a weapon. In such
circumstances, the vehicle's occupants may be frisked.7 3 However,
officers should understand that the term "stop and frisk" is somewhat
misleading.74 Officers need separate justifications for the initial
reasonable suspicion to justify searching a vehicle when the passenger was wearing a
bullet proof vest underneath an open collar shirt); Turner v. United States, 623 A.2d
1170, 1172-73 (1993) (reasoning that agents who overheard a discussion of a transfer of
a firearm to be used in a murder had reasonable suspicion to search the suspect's vehicle
for weapons); State v. Dilyerd, 467 So.2d 301, 305 (Fla. 1985) (explaining that the
suspect's furtive movement toward the floor of the vehicle as the officer approached was
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a vehicular search).
70. See infra Part IV.
71. See infra Part V.
7 2. See infra Part VI.
73. See supra note 69 (discussing the grounds for "reasonable suspicion").
74. Officers have been trained in the "stop and frisk" technique, whereby an
individual is stopped based upon reasonable suspicion that the person may be involved
in criminal activity, and the individual is questioned on the spot during this
investigative detention. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. During such encounter, if the police
have or develop reasonable suspicion that the detainee may be presently armed with a
weapon, the detainee may be searched for a weapon. See id. at 24. Accordingly, if the
police have reasonable suspicion that the stopped vehicle might contain a weapon, the
circumstances surrounding the vehicle stop might give the officers reasonable suspicion
that the occupants may be presently armed.
It has been the author's experience that over time, officers may forget that separate
justifications are required for the initial stop and the subsequent frisk. Officers
sometimes mistakenly believe that a frisk may always follow a lawful stop.
Unfortunately, these officers merge the two justifications into one, which may cause
evidence to be suppressed. Due to the plain feel exception and the phrase "frisk for
narcotics" that may mistakenly creep into one's vocabulary, the author emphasizes the
use of such phrases as "armed with a weapon" and "frisk for weapons" even though these
phrases appear to be redundant.
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vehicular stop and the subsequent personal frisk. A frisk does not
automatically follow a stop. As a threshold matter, the initial traffic
stop must be justified.75 In most cases, this will not be a problem.
Where pretextual traffic stops conducted by narcotics officers were
once viewed with some suspicion, the United States Supreme Court
has ruled that such stops are proper 7as6 long as there was an underlying
traffic violation supporting the stop.
If a stop is justified, officers must then have reasonable suspicion
that the suspect is presently armed with a weapon. Officers should be
wary of questions posed by defense attorneys that concern the "frisk
for narcotics" because there is no such thing. The sole justification for
a personal frisk is officer self-protection. It is never a frisk for
narcotics or other evidence, not even pursuant to the plain feel
exception first espoused in 1993." 7 The plain feel exception did not
expand the Terry-type frisk.78 It merely allowed the seizure of
something which, during the protective pat-down, is immediately
discerned to be contraband.
In sum, a vehicular frisk is a limited search exception. Specifically,
before performing a vehicular frisk, officers must have a reasonable
suspicion that the subject vehicle contains a weapon. Moreover, the
officers are limited to searching for weapons only. Finally, the search
area is restricted to the passenger area and its unlocked containers.
IV. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
A third exception to the search warrant requirement is the search
incident to arrest. Under this theory, if an occupant of a vehicle is
arrested, a limited search of the vehicle may be conducted.79 The
75. See id. at 29 ("[E]vidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means of a
seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the justification for
their initiation.").
76. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (holding that narcotics
officers' probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had been committed rendered
the stop reasonable and the evidence uncovered thereafter admissible even if a nonnarcotics officer would not have stopped the motorist for the same traffic violation),
subsequent appeal, 111 F.3d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1059
(1998).
77. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 371 (1993).
78. A Terry-type frisk is a limited search or patdown of someone based upon
reasonable suspicion that the person is presently armed with a weapon. See Terry, 392
U.S. at 27. The Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson did not expand this precept. See
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373. Dickerson established the plain feel exception to the
search warrant requirement. See id. at 375-76. During a Terry-type frisk for weapons, if
the officer immediately discerns that an item he feels is contraband, and not a weapon,
this contraband may be seized. See id.
79. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
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search is justified based on the officers' need to disarm the arrestee or
to preserve any possible evidence located inside the vehicle.8°
The type of arrest needed to justify a search incident thereto is the
full custody arrest, where the arrestee is customarily handcuffed and
transported to jail. Mere detentions for traffic citation purposes are
insufficient to support a search incident to arrest. 8 1 A full arrest,
however, can occur for misdemeanor traffic violations as long as the
arrestee is taken to jail and booked.82
The arrest of any occupant of a vehicle, either the driver or any
passengers, supports the subsequent search of the passenger
compartment and its unlocked containers.83 The United States
Supreme Court has defined a "container" as "any object that is capable
of holding another object, including closed or open glove
compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within
the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing,
and the like."'84 Unfortunately, the Court did not use the term "loked
containers. 85 Had the Court used the term "locked containers,"
regardless of whether it meant to permit or prohibit searches thereof, it
would have saved subsequent second-guessing. As noted, the search
area of the search incident to an arrest is the same as that for a
vehicular frisk.8 6 The only difference between the two is that an
occupant is arrested in order to support the search incident. In some
cases, a vehicular frisk will precede a search incident to an arrest.
Officers do not need separate probable cause nor reasonable
suspicion to justify a search incident to an arrest. The sole prerequisite
is a valid custodial arrest. 87 Officers need not have any suspicion or
hope of finding fruits, evidence or instrumentalities as a result of the
search.
Even if the driver or sole occupant of the car has been handcuffed
and placed into the squad car, an officer may still conduct a search of
80. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
81. Such minor intrusions are not arrests, thus, a search incident to an arrest cannot
occur due to the lack of the prerequisite arrest.
82. See People v. Bailey, 639 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (Ill. 1994). But see State v.
Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ohio 1992) (holding that an arrest for a traffic violation
does not automatically entitle an officer to conduct a detailed search of the arrestee's
vehicle).
83. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
84. Id. at 460 n.4.
85. See id.
86. See supra Part III.
87. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979); United States v. Arango,
879 F.2d 1501, 1504 (7th Cir. 1989).
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the passenger compartment incident to the arrest.88 Clearly, in such a
situation, the arrestee is unable to obtain a weapon from the car or to
hide evidence present therein. Although it may seem to be a legal
fiction, this procedure is sanctioned by the United States Supreme
Court. 89 However, a limitation exists because a search of a vehicle
incident to an arrest must be conducted contemporaneously with the
arrest.9" Although it is difficult to specify the precise number of
minutes after the arrest in which a search incident may be conducted, it
is wise to conduct such a search as quickly as possible after the arrest
has taken place and before the arrestee or the vehicle is transported
from the site. 91 If the officer waits forty-five minutes for a backup
officer, tow truck, or canine unit, a subsequent search of the passenger
compartment and its unlocked containers will not be a search incident
to the arrest. However, such a search may be justified pursuant to
another exception to the search warrant requirement.
The permissible search area under a search incident to arrest of an
occupant is the passenger compartment and unlocked containers found
therein.92 If someone is arrested outside of a vehicle and was not an
occupant just prior to the arrest, the proper search area is analyzed
under a slightly different, non-vehicle approach. The search area is
limited to where an arrestee might reach for a weapon or items of
evidence. This standard for non-vehicular searches incident to arrest,
often referred to as the "lunging distance," is espoused in Chimel v.
California.93 The restricted search area cannot be defined in exact
distances because the distances will vary widely depending upon the
arrestee and the arrest site itself.
The trunk is off limits during a search incident to arrest, as are most
locked containers including the locked glove box.94 However, some
courts have held that even some locked containers may be opened
pursuant to a search incident to an arrest. 95 However, this is almost
88. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 971-72 (7th
Cir. 1988); People v. Loftus, 444 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
89. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 462; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
92. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61.
93. 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (describing "lunging distance" as the area from which
an arrestee could gain possession of a weapon or conceal any evidence); See United
States v. Adams, 26 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 1994); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7. 1(b) (3d ed. 1996).
94. See United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 878 (10th Cir. 1991).
95. See United States v. Gonzales, 71 F. 3d 819, 826-27 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a search of a glove compartment subsequent to a lawful arrest is constitutionally
permissible); United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365, 1372 (7th Cir. 1995) (deciding that
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academic because it is usually the driver who is arrested, and the
vehicle is subsequently impounded and an inventory search
performed. During most inventory searches, locked glove boxes and
locked trunks will be opened.
Overall, a search incident to arrest requires a valid, full custodial
arrest of a vehicle's occupant. Officers may only search the passenger
area and its unlocked containers. The search must be conducted
shortly after the arrest but before the arrestee or the vehicle is moved
from the scene. However, an officer may still conduct a search after
the arrestee has been put in the squad car.
V. VEHICLE EXCEPTION
A fourth type of search that may be conducted without a warrant is
the vehicle exception search. In the event that officers have probable
cause that certain evidence or contraband is somewhere inside a
vehicle, they may search the vehicle for such evidence without a
warrant. First established in 1925,96 this exception is perhaps the
most far-reaching exception to the search warrant requirement for
vehicles. The exception may be invoked at the scene of the stop or
later during a search conducted at the police station.9 7 The theory may
also apply to parked vehicles. 98 This warrant exception was first
justified by vehicle mobility and the need for swift on-the-scene action
by police.99
Currently, the exception is still based on the mobility but even more
so on the pervasive regulation and diminished expectation of vehicle
privacy.1 °° All motor vehicles are subjected to pervasive regulation in
the sense that every vehicle is registered and has license plates or tags
a secret compartment in the back seat area was part of the "passenger compartment" and
thus lawfully searched by the officers); United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1269-70
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a search of a locked glove box incident to an arrest is
reasonable because an arrestee can possibly break away and retrieve a weapon from that
locked area).
96. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); see also infra Part VI.
97. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1970); Texas v. White, 423 U.S.
67, 68 (1975); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382 (1984).
98. See United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 858-59 (9th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523, 530 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Foxworth, 8 F.3d 540, 54546 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Home, 4 F.3d 579, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1993); United
States v. McCoy, 977 F.2d 706, 710-11 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Bagley, 772
F.2d 482, 491 (9th Cir. 1985); Speight v. United States, 671 A.2d 442, 445-46 (D.C.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 375 (1996).
99. See Carroll,267 U.S. at 153-54.
100. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 (1985); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976).
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issued by the state. In some municipalities, such as Chicago, vehicles
registered to addresses within the city limits must display a vehicle
sticker or decal. Trucks are subjected to even more regulation, based
upon what they haul. Truck weigh stations are a common sight on the
interstates. Due to the number of windows on a vehicle, the vehicle
occupants are usually exposed somewhat to public view. The
vehicle's windows are regulated with prohibitions against certain types
of tinted glass.'' While a vehicle is parked, anyone may approach
and look into the vehicle through the windows. 2
Although broad in scope, the vehicle exception search theory
requires probable cause'0 3 to support the search.'0 4 In other words,
officers must have enough facts at the scene so that they could
theoretically draft an affidavit in support of a search warrant. Probable
cause is a nebulous concept, and no litmus-type test exists to determine
whether it is met. In practical terms, probable cause exists when
someone neutral and detached, such as a magistrate, is convinced that
a reasonable officer would believe that the evidence sought will be
located in a particular place. Probable cause may develop as a result of
evidence found during an investigative stop or a search incident to a
lawful custodial arrest.'0 5 For example, signals emanating from an
electronic device implanted in bank loot provide probable cause for a
search of the robber's car trunk. 06 In addition, the odor of burnt
marijuana emanating from a motorist may satisfy the probable cause
07
threshold requirement to search the vehicle, including the trunk.
However, one court has held that such an odor is not enough, when
followed by a fruitless search of the passenger compartment, to justify
a search of the trunk as the officer found nothing to corroborate the
odor.'08
This search theory allows officers to conduct a search on the scene
101. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-503 (West Supp. 1998).
102. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1986) (addressing the general
usage of the term "pervasive regulation").
103. Probable cause is a reasonable belief that an item sought will be located. It was
defined by the United States Supreme Court, for contraband searches, as a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). It requires a higher level of certainty
than suspicion. See Mason v. Godinez, 47 F.3d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 1995).
104. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155-56. Additionally, the term, "vehicle exception,"
encompasses a motor home.
105. See United States v. Harvey, 788 F.Supp. 966, 970 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
106. See United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 133 (5th Cir. 1996).
107. See United States v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87, 90-91 (8th Cir. 1989).
108. See United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993).
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or back at the station. 10 9 Moreover, the length of time a search may
take is not determinative."0 Although time may be on the side of the
officers, they should conduct a thorough search as soon as it is
practical to do so. If a search is not conducted quickly, the defense
may argue that the officers should have obtained a search warrant
because they had ample time to do so. This argument might put the
prosecution on the defensive, especially in cases where the probable
cause to support the vehicle exception was weak. However, an
officer's time and opportunity to obtain a search warrant is irrelevant in
determining the applicability of the vehicle exception."'
When a container is found in a vehicle and officers have probable
cause to believe that it holds contraband, the officers may use the
vehicle exception to seize the container and open it. 112 Without more,
however, the officers will need additional justification to search the
other areas of the vehicle and any containers therein." 3 Evidence
discovered during a search of a container can be a factor in developing
probable cause that still other evidence may be located in other areas of
the vehicle." 4 In those circumstances, the vehicle exception will be
used twice--once to open the container and then again to conduct a
more expansive search.
One common misconception is that exigent circumstances are
needed for this warrant exception to apply. Exigent circumstances
may include the mobility of the vehicle itself, such as a hot
pursuit/chase or a true life-or-death issue. Some courts have referred
to the vehicle's inherent mobility as exigent circumstances.' Despite
case law to the contrary, this myth still prevails." 6 In Michigan v.
Thomas,"7 the United States Supreme Court held that the justification
for conducting a vehicle exception search does not vanish when the
vehicle has been immobilized, is not likely to be driven away, or
109. See United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1985); Texas v. White, 423
U.S. 67, 68 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
110. See Johns, 469 U.S. at 487-88.
111. See id. at 487-88 (upholding a search which occurred three days after packages
were removed from the vehicle); United States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284, 291 (7th Cir.
1990); United States v. Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 490 (10th Cir. 1985).
112. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1991).
113. See id. at 580.
114. For example, ammunition found in a container, coupled with other facts
resulting from an investigation, may lead an officer to reasonably believe that there may
be a firearm somewhere else in the vehicle.
115. See Reis, 906 F.2d at 291; United States v. Rivera, 825 F.2d 152, 158 (7th Cir.
1987); United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 491 (9th Cir. 1985).
116. See Johns, 469 U.S. at 486-87.
117. 458 U.S. 259 (1982).

Vehicle Searches

1998]

with during the
without regard to whether its contents will be tampered
8
period required for the police to obtain a warrant."
Another common misconception held by some officers is that the
vehicle exception allows officers to search every part of the vehicle and
all of its containers. In reality, the permissible scope of the search is
the same as if a warrant had been procured." 9 For example, if the
probable cause goes only to large, stolen stereo speakers, then officers
may not search the glove box nor any briefcases, since these places are
too small to hold the desired items. In order to search these items,
other exceptions to the warrant requirement would be necessary. With
requisite probable cause, officers may only search the vehicle itself and
any of its contents that may conceal the object of the search.'
Overall, a vehicle exception search requires probable cause
sufficient to obtain a warrant. A vehicle exception search may be made
immediately after a traffic stop or for a period after, but the sooner the
search is conducted, the better. Finally, officers may search wherever
the object sought could be found, not anywhere else.
VI. INVENTORY SEARCHES

The fifth search warrant exception method is the inventory search.
An inventory search is the search of property lawfully seized and
detained in order to ensure that the property is harmless, to secure
valuable items and to protect against false claims.' 2 ' Inventory
searches serve the following three general purposes: (1) to safeguard
valuables; (2) to protect law enforcement agencies against unjustified
claims for lost or damaged property; and (3) to protect law
enforcement agencies from potentially dangerous items that may have
come into their possession. 122 These three purposes are important for
officers to remember in order to avoid being tripped up during a crossexamination.
Procuring evidence is not among the justifications for conducting
inventory searches. If items of evidence are found during an inventory
search, they are merely bonuses. However, during an inventory
search, it is possible that a simultaneous search may be made under the
vehicle exception. In that event, the search is clearly two-fold. The
officers are looking for evidence while also conducting a non118.
1990).
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id. at 261; see also United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1271 (1st Cir.
See
See
See
See

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
id.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369.
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evidentiary inventory. Therefore, officers should refrain from
answering questions posed to them concerning their "inventory search
for evidence" because no such search exists.123 Justifying a search
solely under the inventory exception could be fatal to the case because
it will appear that the inventory search is merely a pretext for an
evidentiary search. Similarly, if officers conduct a thorough search
pursuant to the vehicle exception, they should also administer an
inventory search. If they forego an inventory search, other inventory
searches will appear to be mere pretexts for evidentiary searches.
Care should also be taken when documents or tape recordings are
located during an inventory search. Since an inventory search is not,
and cannot be, a search for evidence, actually reading the documents
or listening to the tapes might be construed as an evidentiary search
falling outside the scope of an inventory search. Obviously, reading
documents or listening to tapes does not advance the three general
purposes noted for justifying inventory searches.124
Law enforcement agencies should have a formal written policy
regarding inventory searches and their parameters, including locked
containers. Included in the policy should be a mandate that officers
conduct an inventory search on every impounded vehicle. Such a
mandate helps the department to maintain its credibility with the courts.
Specifically, by failing to conduct an inventory search, the officers
show the court the following: that they do not care to safeguard
valuables that may be found in the vehicle; that they do not care about
protecting the department from unjustified claims of lost or stolen
property; and that they do not care whether the vehicle contained
anything dangerous.
A standard form may also be useful when conducting an inventory
search. Indeed, departments that leave the scope of inventory searches
to individual officers are asking for trouble. 25 Departments without a
standard form for officers to use will find that their officers are being
given too much discretion in deciding when to conduct an inventory
search and how the search should be conducted. As such, for the
seizure of a given object, different officers may come to different
123. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4; Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1987).
124. But see State v. Weber, 471 N.W.2d 187, 193-95 (Wis. 1991) (upholding the
listening of a cassette tape as part of an inventory search because an officer needs to
listen to the tape in order to properly inventory the item).
125. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4 (determining that absent a policy regarding inventory
searches, the evidence found in a suitcase in the vehicle should be suppressed); Bertine,
479 U.S. at 374-75 (discussing the unreasonableness in expecting officers in the
everyday course of their job to make the subtle distinctions in deciding what can and
cannot be searched).
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conclusions whether to conduct such a search, and the scope of any
such search may differ depending upon the individual officer.
The FBI uses a standard form for such searches. 2 6 Using such a
form helps convince courts that the search was not a pretext search for
evidence but was instead a proper inventory search. The FBI form
indicates that locked containers should not be forced open unless a
compelling reason exists to do so. Accordingly, in some cases, unless
another search method is successfully used, the inventory sheet will
indicate that a locked item, contents unknown, is being inventoried.
Overall, the distinguishing feature of an inventory search is that it is
not a search for evidence. In addition, to assist in adhering to proper
form when making inventory searches, law enforcement agencies
should use standardized criteria. Importantly, officers need a
compelling reason to break open locked items and should obtain a
warrant to read documents and/or listen to tapes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Various methods of conducting a vehicle search without a warrant
are available to law enforcement officers. A firm grasp of each
theory's particular parameters will enable investigating officers to
testify more effectively and to uphold more vehicle searches in court.
Officers who can readily discern each theory's limitations will know
which theory will obtain the most expansive search legally permissible
while simultaneously complying with each theory's own limitations.

126. The form is known as a Motor Vehicle Inspection Inventory Record.
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Table 1
PERMISSIBLE SEARCH AREAS -

VEHICLE SEARCHES
BY SEARCH THEORY

SEARCH
THEORY

Passenger area
and its
unlocked items

Locked items
within the
passenger area

Trunk

Consent

X

X

X

Vehicular frisk

X

Search incident

X

Vehicle

X

X

X

X

X

X

exception
Inventory
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Table 2
OBJECT OF THE VEHICLE SEARCH
BY SEARCH THEORY
SEARCH What he Weapons
HORY consented only
to

kConsent
Vehicular
Frisk
Search
inicident
to arrest
Vehicle
exception
,irventory

Fruits,
Items for
evidence, which
etc.
there is
probable
cause

Whatever

X
X
X

X
X
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Table 3
PREREQUISITES FOR A VEHICLE SEARCH
BY SEARCH THEORY

SEARCH Voluntary Reas.
suspicion
TBEORY consent
of a
by one
weapon
with
authority inside
vehicle
Consent
Vehicular
frisk
Search
incident
to arrest
Vehicle
exception

Inventory

Valid full- Enough
probable
custody
cause for
arrest
a search
warrant

Written
policy for
inventory
searches

X
X
X

X

x
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Table 4
SEARCH OF VEHICLES FLOWCHART

